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ABUSE OF CONFIDENTIALITY AND FABRICATED CONTROVERSY: 
TWO PROPOSALS 
by John A. ~ u m b a c h '  
The future of the Republic, to a great extent, depends upon our maintenance oj 
Justice pure and unsullied. It cannot be so maintained unless the conduct and 
motives of the members of our profession are such as to merit the approval of all 
just 
I. A CRISIS OF PUBLIC CONFIDENCE 
Public faith in the legal profession is not merely low but, according to recent polling3 it has been 
declining at a disturbing rate. OC4. profession's unfortunate ethical reputation is not exactly news, of 
course, but the rapidity of the downward trend is cause for renewed concern. During the past decade 
the percentage of people willing to rate layers '  honesty and ethical standards as "high" or "vety high" 
has dropped from 22% to 13%, an average decline of nearly 1% per year.4 According to the pollsters, 
layers  are ranked among "the five professions and occupations considered least honest by the 
American public,'" and the legal profession is among the three that had "lost the most in the ratings over 
the last ten years."6 While these polls may not be perfect reflections of public sentiment, it seems safe to 
say that, in terms of our reputation for ethics and honesty, the past 10 years have not exactly been a 
decade of progress. 
One can, of course, debate the importance of such public opinions. If, however, the old Canons 
were right, it may be "peculiarly essential" to the long-term stability of our American form of 
government that the public can trust the layers  who steward its laws and its justice.' As long as people 
do not trust the integrity of the layers who administer the legal system, they will never fmd it easy to 
trust the system as a whole, and the distrust of layers  runs deep. The documented public cynicism 
about l a y e r  ethics and trustworthiness is, therefore, no mere trifling concern. It is a valuable measure of 
' Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law, 78 North Broadway, Whte Plains, N.Y. 10603 (914-422-4239). 
Several of the problems dealt with here are also the subject of parallel discussiom contained in written testimony 
prepared by the author for the E h c s  2000 Commission of the American Bar Association and in John A. Humbach, 
Tke N&nalAssociation ofHonestLawyers, AnEssay onHones@, 'Lawyer Hones@" andpublic Trust m theLegal Systeq 20 
PaceL. Rev. 93 (1999). 
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Preamble (1 908) (hereinaftere'ABA CANONS"). 
Leslie McAneny, NwsesDlrplacePhamvclrtsat Top ofExpandedHones@ andEthicsPol1, Gallup Release of Nov. 16, 
1999, available atht~://www.gallup.com/poll/releases/pr991116.asp. 
ld A-. 
Id. This ranking on Gallup's "Bottom Five list" was based on the percentages of people who listedthe profession 
as low or very low in terms of honesty and ethics, when asked the question: "Please tell me how you would rate the 
honesty and ethical standards of people in these different fields - veIy high, high, average, low or veIy low? First, ... 
Next . W O M  ORDER]." Id. Members of the medical professions were ranked the highest in honesty and 
ethical standards. Id 
Id. As a result of the recent declines, lawyers now have an overall ranking that is just below that of real estate 
agents and just above that of gun salesmen. Id However, contraIy to popular myth, lawyers have consistently 
ranked well above car salesmen, at least since the late 1970s, surely a point of some distinction. Id. at 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/indicators/indhnsty~cs.asp and 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/indicators/indhnsty~cs2.asp 
' ABA CANONS Meamble. 
how well the profession is performing its responsibilities of self-regulation. 
Mistrust and the Model R u l e s I t  is doubtful that the legal profession's poor reputation for 
honesty and ethical standards could be so persistent without some genuine foundation in layers'  norms 
of behavior. Yet, most layers are actually quite scrupulous (at least in my experience) about observing 
what they believe is expected of them under the profession's ethical standards. The possibility must 
therefore be at least considered that there is something about the ethical standards themselves that leads 
layers to act in ways the public fmds repugnant. 
A principal purpose of this article is to consider the hypothesis that the public's view of layers 
is tied directly to negative reactions people have to two related advocacy norms that seem to be rooted 
in provisions of the Model Rules of Professional C~nduct .~  These norms are typically expressed in two 
particular practices of layers, namely: (1) pretending to disagree in the hope that, by not "conceding" a 
point, the l a y e r  might get the client an added chance to avoid a legally prescribed liability, sanction, 
nonsuit or other undesired outcome; and (2) fostering misunderstandings by selectively invoking 
confidentiality in order to hide material parts of the trutb while vigorously (and misleadingly) asserting 
others. The fmt of these practices, which I shall call "fabricating controversy," is sometimes described 
more charitably as endeavoring "to use legal procedure for the fullest benefit of the client's cause.'" The 
second, which I shall call "partial-truth advo~acy,"'~ emerges from a joint reading of the Model Rules on 
confidentiality and on diligence." 
Both of these practices are likely to be stoutly defended by many in the bar, perhaps even as 
crucial aspects of the adversq sy~tem. '~  At the same, however, neither of these practices would likely 
be recognized as fully "honest" or "ethical" as those conceptions are generally understood in ordinq, 
non-layer contexts. No one finds it easy to trust people who pretend things in order to get better than 
they deserve or who induce false understandings by means of partial disclosures and "half-truths." Yet, 
both of these norms of advocacy behavior are reinforced and propagated by a fair reading of the 
current Model Rules. Before much progress can be made to rehabilitate our profession's reputation for 
honesty and ethical standards, it will probably be necessq that the Model Rules themselves be clarified 
in certain respects. 
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983), as set forth  A AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ANNOTATED 
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (4th ed. 1999) (hereinafter "MODEL RULES"). Adopted in most of the 
states, the Model Rules contain modifications that vary from state to state. 
MODEL RULE$ Rule 3.1, cmt. [I]. 
10 A fuller and more precise definition of patial-truth advocacy appears in part I11 "Abuse of Confidentiality," inpa. 
11 MODEL RULES Rule 1.6 AND Rule 1.3, respectively. 
12 This is a claim of necessity that is, to say the leasf debatable. See Joint Conference onProfessiona1 
Responsibility, ProfemondRespodd@:Rep~of the  JomtCo$erence, 44 A.B.A.J. 1158 (1959, reprmted m GEOFFREY 
C. HAZARD, JR. AND DEBORAH L. RHODE, THE LEGAL PROFESSION: RESPONSIBILITY AND REGULATION 148-51 (3d 
ed. 1994) (specifically decrying the misuse of partisan advocacy to mislead distort or obfuscate, and declaring that a 
lawyer "trespassa against the obligations of professional responsibilities when his desire to win leads him to 
muddy the headwaters of decision"). See alsoPeter C. Kostant, BreedmgBetter Watchdogs:Mul~~ciplUUyPar62ersh@s 
inCorporateLegdPractice, 84 M I ~ L  Rev. 1213, 1215-19,1253-58 (2000) (obsenring that the profession's [rleliance 
on a flawed model of legal e h c s "  has led to other serious problems as well, helping to pave the way for competition 
from so-called multi&sciplimry practice f k s ) .  
The balance of this article will be framed as a discussion of two proposals for modifying the 
Model Rules. One muld declare fabricated controversy to be out of bounds as a tactical tool. The 
other would expressly a f f i  that it is an abuse of confidentiality for lamyers to engage in strategies of 
partial-truth advocacy, to assert partial truths while deliberately blding back other information that the 
l a y e r  should know is needed in order not to mislead others. Both of these techniques, fabrication of 
controversy and partial-truth advocacy, tend to undercut the trial as a "search for truth"I3 and both 
interfere with negotiations as a search for fairness in transactions.I4 Both, moreover, are utilized by 
layers  precisely because they undercut and interfere with the intended functioning of these processes. 
They are resorted to by diligent advocates when factual truth would ill-serve the client's interest at trial, 
and by diligent negotiators when truthful disclosure would likely prevent a client from getting a deal that 
the other party would make only if deluded.I5 Finally, and worst of all, both of these layering 
techniques detract from the legal system's ability to achieve the "gold standard" of justice and the rule of 
law, viz. the substance of the law applied to the events that actually occur. 
11. FABRICATING CONTROVERSY 
Nothing operates more certainly to create or to foster popular prejudice 
against lawyers . . . than does the false claim, often set up by the 
unscrupulous in defense of questionable transactions, that it is the duty of 
the lawyer to do whatever may enable him to succeed in winning his 
client's cause.'6 
The first of the two reputatiomimpairing practices I will discuss is fabricating controversy, the 
strategic technique of pretending to disagree on issues of procedure or substance in an effort to obtain 
an ultimate resolution that the client likes better than having "the substance of the law applied to the 
events that actually occurred." When layers  fabricate controversy they are making a play on basic 
features of the dispute-resolution process itself--the costs it imposes on the opponent, the uncertainties 
it engenders, and the opportunity for lucky accidents that it provides. By raising disingenuous disputes 
that then require "process" to resolve, a skillful l a y e r  can exploit the potentials for error that are 
intrinsic to the process itself and turn those potentials to the client's advantage. Thus, when clients want 
to escape the law's prescribed liabilities or sanctions for things they have done, or to obtain other 
unmerited benefits, layers  have a lawful way to advance these client "interests." By contesting issues 
on which the parties do not really disagree, a diligent advocate can secure for the client an added 
chance to "snatch victoty from the jaws of defeat." 
l 3  NLXv mtes ide ,  475 US.  157,164 (1986). 
14 See Russell B. Korobkin, A P o f i e  Tkeoy oflegdNegotidon, 88 GeorgetownLJ 1789,1818-29 (2000), identifying 
the strategic imperatives of negotiations as agreeing on a single deal-point that allocates "surplus" ("surplus 
allocation") within the defined range of possible agreements. The result would be an agreement that is mutually 
beneficial and in that sense, fair. 
15 The mles do not, of course, permit the lawyer to assist the client in committing perjury or fraud. See MODEL RULE$ 
Rule 12(d) andRule 3.3. But the narrow interpretations of these limitations have left ample leeway for lawyers to make 
effective use of fabricated controversy and padial-truth advocacy to help their clients escape tight situations. See, 
e.g., Bronston v. United States, 409 U S .  352 (1973) (no perju~y if witness states the "literal tmth); Schatz v. 
Rosenberg ,943 F 2 d  485 (4th Cir. 1991) (upholding, despite bar's condemnation, assertion of confidentiality mle to 
conceal information concerning the clients' disastrous financial condition because disclosure by the attorney would 
probably have caused the other pady to reject the clients' promissory notes and guarantees in a sale of corporate 
securities). 
l6 ABA CANONS Canon 15. 
As long as pretended disputations are not frivolous or dilatoty," many layers  see nothing 
wrong with such plays on the system's fact-fmding imperfections. Nor do they see anyhng wrong with 
wing to get their clients better than the clients legally deserve, for example, by avoiding the prescribed 
consequences for wrongs they have committed. The vety fact that many layers see things this way is, 
of course, part of the reason for the public's negative perception of the profession. 
The current Model Rules do not seem to condemn these practices, either. The Model Rules do 
contain provisions that prohibit "frivolous" contentions and dilatoty tactics.I8 However, as we shall see," 
these prohibitions apparently do not prevent a l a y e r  from asserting contentions that have a reasonable 
likelihood of being upheld even if the la\?yer hows  (or reasonably should h o w )  that success in the 
contention will depend on somebody making a mistake, most likely by inaccurate fact fmding. Consider, 
for example, a l a y e r  who has confidential information from which the l a y e r  reasonably should h o w  
that the client's cause lacks substantive merit, e.g., the client really committed the tort alleged but the 
l a y e r  nevertheless believes the case can be won. The lawyer may believe it can be won because, for 
example, the plaintiffs key witnesses are particularly vulnerable on cross-examination or because 
certain information the plaintiffs need to make their case is almost certainly beyond their reach or, even, 
unsuspected by them. I dare say few layers would maintain that there would be anyhng frivolous or 
dilatoty about going for victoty in such a case. The current Model Rules on frivolous and dilatoty 
contentions would seem to allow it and, arguably, Model Rule 1.3 (Diligence) may even command it.'' 
Nevertheless, to achieve legal victoty without substantive merit is not justice, and winnability 
alone is not a just standard of meritoriousness. To make it clear that the profession's responsibility to 
justice does not permit layers  to seize evety available legal victoty, irrespective of actual factual merit, 
the Model Rules should contain an explicit prohibition on fabricating controversy, which might read as 
follows: 
A l a y e r  shall not fabricate controversy or otherwise pretend disagreements by putting 
a point into contention when the l a y e r  h o w s  or reasonably should h o w  that there is 
no real difference between the parties' actual understandings of the facts or applicable 
law. 
Fabricated Controversy is Parasitic to the Basic Function of Legal Proces sA  l a y e r  
may see a strategic value in contesting a factual point or issue even though, with reasonable investigation, 
the l a y e r  should h o w  that the parties have no genuine disagreement on the point or issue. For 
17 I.e., as long as they are reasonably well supported by the admissible evidence. See "Fabricated Controversy 
Distinguished from Merely 'Frivolous' or 'Dilatory' Contentions," infra. 
18 See MODEL RULE$ Rule 3.1 (Meritorious Claims and Contentions) and Rule 3.2 (Expediting Litigation), 
respectively. 
19 See "Fabricated Controversy Distinguished from Merely 'Frivolous' or 'Dilatory' Contentions," infra 
20 Id. There are, for example, relatively recent ethics opinions to the effect that a lawyer can bring an action that the 
lawyer knows to be time-barred or subject to an affirmative defense--presumably without mentioning the existence 
of these fatal defects in the client's "cause." See Comm. on Legal Ethics and Professional Respomibility of Pa. Bar 
Ass'n, Op. 96-80 (1996) ( h e  barred); LegalEhcs Comm. of Or. State Bar, Op. 1991-21 (1991) (validaffinnative 
defense); see also ABA Formal Opinion94-387 (disclosure to opposing party and court that statute of limitations has 
-). A logical place to insert this new language would be in Model Rule 3.1, just after the current rule's first sentence. 
example, even without any underlying disagreement on some factual point the l a y e r  may still see value 
in "making them prove it" simply because, on the particular evidence at hand the l a y e r  has a 
reasonable shot at success and success on the point would be to the client's advantage. It may save the 
client i?om liability, sanction or other undesired legal consequence. In such situations there is, however, 
actually only a pretense of controversy. In effect, the l a y e r  is making a naked play on the legal 
process, taking a stand in an effort to get a benefit or advantage that the substance of the law does not 
mean to provide. Similarly, when layers  invoke procedures, formal requirements or defenses merely 
because the point seems "winnable" and advantageous, and not because there is any genuine 
disagreement on the legally relevant facts, the dispute is again only a pretense. Raising the dispute into 
controversy serves no purpose except to give the client a chance to gain from the process of dispute- 
resolution itself. These pretended disputations are parasitic to the basic functioning of the legal process, 
which exists to resolve real disputes. They can only add to the system's costs while distracting from its 
mission, contributing to the public's impression that, with a smart layer ,  a person can escape from the 
burdens of the law. 
The possibilities for pretending disagreement are manifold. Fabricated controversies can be 
concocted as to matters of procedure or of substance. They may relate to minor collateral points or to 
the core matters in question. However, whatever the specific context, the reason tbat fabricated 
controversies can be successful is genemlly always the same, namely, like all human systems the law's 
fact-fmding system is not perfect and can make mistakes. The traces left behind by legally relevant 
events are often fragmentaty and conflicting. Witnesses may have background weaknesses that can 
make cross-examination devastating even when their direct testimony is fully true. Or a crucial witness 
may refuse to cooperate, or may fail to appear entirely." Because of these and other elements of chance 
that are endemic to the process, skillful advocates can sometimes paint pictures of past events that are 
vety different, legally speaking, from the events that actually occurred or they can, alternatively, keep 
the opponent from presenting a picture that is true. It can all be done, moreover, without resort to direct 
falsehoods or other illegality. 
While the discussion that follows here will focus on the litigation context, it bears remembering 
that the vety same sorts of parasitic resort to phony disputation can also occur in the context of 
transactions. By judiciously raising disputes over this or that issue, a l a y e r  in negotiations can 
obfuscate, distract and otherwise create needs for a negotiated "resolutions," so the layer 's  client can 
then gain extra advantages from the resolutions that result, even when there was no real disagreement in 
the fmt place.23 This manner of bargaining may be regarded as simply "smart" negotiating tactics, or as 
underhanded depending on your point of view. 
Winnability vs. Justice-As evety l a y e r  knows, there can be a big difference between 
being entitled to a legal outcome and being able to prove the facts that the law requires in order to 
establish that entitlement. This discrepancy between provability md entitlement can be the source of 
much injustice, and it can occur due to a variety of imperfections in the fact-finding process. For 
example, as noted in the preceding section, it can occur because one of the parties, due to bad luck or 
happenstance, simply lacks access to sufficient admissible evidence to prove the truth. It can occur 
22 For example, an impecunious insured who is the "client" of an insurance defense lawyer may have no incentive to 
take paJt in the defense at all-especially if the policy has been cancelled. 
23 See Korobkin, supra note 14. 
because juries and others can make mistakes or be misled-especially if one of the advocates is 
forcefully pressing a portion of the trutb while deliberately concealing the remainder (see "Abuse of 
Confidential@," infra). Also, it can occur because parties sometimes are simply unable to afford what it 
takes to establish facts which with greater resources, they could readily have proved. Most generally, 
"imperfections" in the process can be understood to refer to any factor whatsoever whose effect is to 
allow a party, without violating any law or rule, to prevent the substance of the law from applying to the 
facts that actually occurred. 
Whatever the source of the imperfections, layers  and their clients may be understandably 
tempted to take advantage of them when, otherwise, the "law is against them" but they nonetheless 
desire to obtain a certain legal benefit (e.g., a money judgment) or to avoid a legally prescribed 
detriment or sanction. So even when there is no real disagreement with other side, and therefore no real 
"dispute" for the law's dispute-resolution machinety to resolve, they may be tempted to see the 
machinety itself as an opportunity, a chance for profit. By simply setting the machinety in motion on one 
or another potentially pivotal point, the l a y e r  gets an added opportunity to turn defeat into victoty by 
taking advantage of the potential for error, for chance or for other miscarriage that is inherent in legal 
To some extent these sorts of systemic risks are unavoidable, and it will probably never be 
possible to eliminate entirely the perennial discrepancies that exist between actual legal entitlements and 
provability-in-fact-between winnability and justice. This does not mean, however, that the profession 
should condone conscious efforts by layers  to seize the fortuitous advantages that may be gleaned 
from these discrepancies. Sometimes, too, layers  may simply not h o w  whether their client's cause 
has substantive merit or not; there may be simply no reason to h o w  whether the underlying facts are in 
any way different from what the available evidence indicates. It does not, however, follow that layers  
are free to engage in "willful blindne~s'"~ and pretend controversy in cases where they do have reason 
to h o w .  On the contrary, if on reasonable investigation a l a y e r  should h o w  the client's cause is not 
just, either in whole or in some particular, the ethics of our profession should clearly prohibit the 
fabrication of controversy in an effort to pretend otherwise. While it may be in the client's "interest" to 
gain legal advantages or to avoid disadvantages contrary to the substantive intentions of the law, it is not 
in society's interest or the profession's interest for layers  to knowingly assist them in these ends. It is 
24 Even couts, which are presumably well situated to know, sometimes characterize legal processes as "rolling the 
dice."E.g.,U.S. Bancorp Mo*. Co. v. Bonner MallPshp., 513 U S .  18, 28 (1994);United States v. Graves, 98 F 3 d  
258, 260 (7th Cir. 1996); Federated Rural Elec. Im. CO. v Arkamas Elec. Coops., 48 F3d  294 (8th Cir. 1994). "[A] j u ~ y  
determination, unpredctable in the most neutral circumstances." Gertzv. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U S .  323,360 
(1 974)(dissenting opinion). 
21 A term originating in the criminal law field, to deal with people who try to evade mem rea requirements by 
assuming an ostrich-like attitude toward the facts of what they are doing. See, e.g., United States v. Jewell, 532 F 2 d  
697 (9th Cir. 1976); WAYNE LAFATE AND AUSTIN SCOTT, CRIMINAL AW 219-220 (2d ed. 1986). Sometimes cited as 
an instmctive example of willful blindness in an attorney is Dr. Johmon's famous reply to Boswell when asked "what 
he thought of 'supporting a cause which you know to be bad'." He said: "Sir, you do not know it to be good or bad 
till the Judge determines it." See Wong v. Tabor, 422N.E. 2d 1279,1286 (Ind. App. 1981). However, as Dr. Johnson 
made clear, he was not referring to willful blindness with regard to fm& but was only reflecting a lawyer's normal 
cautious agnosticism about future judicial interpretations of law, for he added flatly: "I have said that you are to 
state the facts fairly." Id. A good deal of the problem of fabricated controversy emerges, it is submitted from a 
maladroit adaptation to contentions of fact of the "winnability" standard of frivolousness, whch  is more fittingly 
confined to arguments of law. 
to these latter kinds of cases that the above-suggested addition to the Model Rules is meant to apply 
Fabricated Controversy Distinguished From Merely "Frivolous" or "Dilatory" 
Contentions- The justice effects of fabricated controversies may be reason to deplore them, but a fair 
interpretation of the current Model Rules seems to allow layers  to raise issues without any real 
underlying disagreement as long as there is a reasonable chance of prevailing. The specific Model Rules 
that come closest to dealing with the question are Rule 3.1 (Meritorious Claims and  contention^)'^ and 
Rule 3.2 (Expediting Litigation)." These two rules forbid frivolous and dilatoty advocacy, respectively. 
However, neither of these rules gives reason to think it is ethically wrong to raise an issue or contest a 
point just because the purpose is to obtain an ultimate outcome that is better for the client than "the 
substance of the law applied to the events that actually occurred." That is to say, neither gives reason to 
think it is wrong to controvert a point simply because the goal happens to be to help the client avoid a 
legally prescribed liability, sanction, nonsuit or other such "merited unpleasantness. On the contrary, 
under both of these rules a la\?yer is apparently justified in assetting a contention in litigation as long as 
the point has some chance of being winnable.28 
The comments to the Model Rules make clear (and the rules themselves leave little doubt) that 
dilatoty refers to contentions raised for purposes of delay," and that the conception of "frivolous" 
contentions focuses on actions "primarily for the purpose of harassing or maliciously injuring a person"30 
or contentions that are so obviously without merit there is virtually no likelihood a court would accept 
them.31 In other words, under the Model Rules' conceptions of frivolous and dilatoty, a position would 
be vindicated as non-iiivolous and nomdilatoty as long as a tribunal reasonabiy might sustain it. Ifthe 
law and available evidentiaq facts are such that a contention has a reasonable likelihood of being 
supportable or tenable in court, the contention would not be considered dilatoty or frivolous, as 
traditionally understo~d.~~ 
The adversarial tactic of fabricating controversies or pretending disagreement is, however, vety 
26 
"A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis for 
doing so that is not frivolous . . "  MODEL RULE$ Rule 3.1 
27 
"A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client." MODEL 
RULES Rule 3.2. 
28 See United States v. Edwards, 777 F 2 d  364, 365 (7th Cir. 1985) (defining frivolousness in terms of "arguments that 
cannot conceivably persuade the court"); RESTATEMENT ( HIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS 5 11 0 ant .  d 
(2000) ("A frivolous position is one that a lawyer of ordinary competence would recognize as so lacking in merit that 
there is no substantial possibility that the tribunal would accept it"); AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ANNOTATED 
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 300 (4th ed. 1999), clnngln re Graham, 453 N.W., 2d 31 3,322 (Mmn 1990) 
("what the reasonable attorney, considered in light of all his professional functions, would do in the same or similar 
circumstances"). See akoABAForma1 Opin 94-387 (1994)(lawyer may press she-barred claim as long as no 
affirmative misrepresentation is made). C j  Mareno v. Rowe, 910 F 2 d  1043, 1047 (2d Clr. 1990) (for purposes of federal 
Rule 1 1, frivolous means no chance of success on law); Wong v. Tabor, 422 N E 2 d  1279,1287 (Ind App. 1981) (if 
grounds exist to "support," malicious prosecution does not lie); Tool Research & Engineering Corp. v. Henigson, 120 
Cal. Rptr 291,297 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975) ( " ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ " ) ; R E ~ T A T E M E N T  (THIRD) OF THELAW GOVERNDIG LAWYERS 5 
57(2) and cmt d and Reporter's Note to cmt. d (2000) (liability of lawyer for malicious prosecution), relying heavily on 
analogous comments in the SecondRestatement of Torts, discussedinfranote 38. 
29 See MODEL RULE$ Rule 3.2, cmt. 
30 See MODEL RULE$ Rule 3.1, cmt [2] (last sentence of second paragraph). 
31 Id. 
32 See supra note 28 
dzerent from dilatoty or frivolous contentions, as traditionally understood; it is a distinctly unethical way 
to secure a legal advantage or to avoid a legal disadvantage. Fabricated controversy is not only vety 
dzerent from traditional frivolous or dilatoty advocacy but it is systemically much worse. The worst 
impact of iiivolous or dilatoty contentions is usually only to cause expense, wheel-spinning and 
perhaps, untoward pressure to settle. By contrast, the tactical purpose of fabricated controversy is to 
try to actually win, despite the fact that a proper substantive predicate for victoty is absent. In other 
words, the fabrication of controversy is a directed effort not just to delay or distract the rule of law but 
actually to derail it, by inducing a court or others to accept ultimate factual conclusions that neither the 
l a y e r  nor the client takes to be true. Indeed the defming characteristic of fabricated controversy is that 
a factual (or legal) position is advocated even though it does not correspond to the beliefs about past 
events or the law that either the l a y e r  or the client actually holds.33 Thus, while alleged instances of 
frivolous or dilatoty contentions can be erased or vindicated by a victoty in court, the vice of fabricated 
controversy is actually enhanced by victoty. The fact that the l a y e r  manages to succeed in fooling a 
tribunal on a matter of trutb does not mean that urging the counterfactual position was legitimate 
advocacy or that the outcome was just. The fallibility or gullibility of juries, judges or negotiating 
counterparts is not the test of whether conduct is honest. 
It may be objected, of course, that the foregoing description of "frivolousness" is too narrow, 
and that the Model Rules already prohibit fabricated controversy under the rubric of "fiivolous" 
conduct. This is possible, but it is not likely-and in any case such a prohibition (if it exists) is certainly 
not vety conspicuous. It is true that nothing contained in Rule 3.1 explicitly prevents a person i?om 
reading the conception of frivolousness more broadly than the rule's comments suggest, so that it would 
encompass layers '  efforts to play the legal process by fabricating controversy. Since, however, Rule 
3.1 is, in effect, an exception to the layer's core duty to diligently advance the client's interests,34 I
think most layers  would probably regard such a expansive reading to be highly dubious. As long as 
nothing in Rule 3.1 expressly forbids layers  from wing to seize the fortuitous advantages that might be 
gained by plays on the process (as long as this can be done without breaking the law), a l a y e r  may feel 
obliged to do so. A l a y e r  may feel obliged that is, to bring or defend a proceeding, or to assert or 
controvert an issue, even when the l a y e r  h o w s  or reasonably believes that the larger outcome being 
sought is not merited under the actual facts and applicable law. 35 
The example given earlier of a l a y e r  who should how,  on the basis of confidential 
information, that the client's tort defense case lacks substantive merit, that the client really committed the 
tort alleged is but one kind of case. Situations like this can be multiplied as clients engage l ayers  in the 
hope of avoiding their legal comeuppances for past behavior, imploring their layers  to "get me out of 
this." In real life, of course, factual histoty is often fairly messy, and layers  many times do not h o w  the 
33 See proposed addition to the Model Rules, supra note 21 
34 See MODEL RULE$ Rule 1.3. 
31 The comment to Rule 3.1 specifies that the advocate has "a duty not to abuse legal procedure." MODEL RULE$ 
Rule 3.1, cmt [I]. It is not, however, obvious that it would be per se an "abuse" of legal procedure for a lawyer to 
invoke legitimate legal processes to help their clients escape the prescribed consequences of their acts. On the 
contrary, the comment hastens to specify that "[tlhe law, both substantive andprocedural, establishes the limits 
within which an advocate may proceed." Id. (emphasis added). Taken as a whole, the comments to Rule 3.1 do not 
appear to treat it as an "abuse" of legal procedure for lawyers to invoke it with the conscious object of f~ustrating 
others' effods to prove substantive entitlements to recoveries, defenses, or other legal dispositions, provided only 
that the lawyer has no purpose to harass or maliciously injure and the lawyer can make a plausible argument for 
invoking the legal procedure in question. 
actual facts with much cettainty. Under present Rule 3.1, however, the l a y e r  has no duty even to try 
to form a reasonable belief on whether the client's cause is a just one within the intendment of the law.36 
Thus, the l a y e r  may fairly conclude from present Rule 3.1 that, in the name of "not beingjudge-and- 
juty of my own client," the l a y e r  should adopt a posture of willful blindne~s,~' to "see no evil, hear no 
evil," so the lawyer can assert with a clear conscience contentions that the actual facts do not 
The ABA's Ethics 2000 Commission has proposed modifications to Model Rule 3.1 and their 
proposed modifications would remedy some of these difficulties. Under the proposals, for example, it 
would be a violation of professional ethics for a l a y e r  to "bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or 
controvert an issue therein, unless the lawyer reasonably believes that there is a basis in law and fact 
for doing so that is not frivolous."39 A new proposed sentence in the comments would make clear that 
"reasonably believes" means a l a y e r  would at least be expected to investigate and to form a 
reasonable belief and could no longer resort to willful blindness, as described in the preceding 
paragraph. 
However, the Commission's proposal still would not remedy the distinct problem of fabricated 
as opposed to merely frivolous or dilatoty conduct. In the Commission's proposal, the pivotal criterion 
for action still centers on the concept of "frivolous," and that concept is still defined in the traditional 
narrow terms of harassment, malicious injuty or machinations that are legally hopeless-too narrow to 
reach the problem of fabricated controversy. Therefore, the Commission's proposed modifications still 
would not declare it improper for layers  to make plays on the system's fact-fmding imperfections to 
avoid or defeat the substance of the law. Layers  still would be able to say that, under a fair 
interpretation of Rule 3.1, it is enough to justlfy asserting a contention in litigation that the point has a 
chance of being winnable. 
36 The duty of competence includes, according to the comments, a requirement that the lawyer inquire into and 
analyze the legal and factual elements of the problem. See MODEL RULES Rule 1.1. It is certainly not clear, however, 
that this ~ u l e  requires lawyers to follow up on leads just because those leads would put a reasonable person on 
notice that the client's cause or objective is not ajust one. That is to say, it is at all not clear that the rules impose 
any duty whatever for the lawyer ever to try to form a belief of the factual justness (as opposed to plausibility or 
winnability) of the client's cause or objective. 
37 See supra note 25 
38 C$ RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 674 ant.  d (1977), which states: "An attorney is not required or expected 
to prejudge his client's claim." However, another section of the same Restatement says, inconsistently, that a person 
does not have probable cause to take an active part in initiating, continuing or procuring civil proceedings unless, 
among other things, "he reasonably believes in the existence of the facts upon which the claim is based." Id. 5 675. 
This latter section implies that, in order to have probable cause to contest an issue, an attorney mustfom a 
reasonable belief as to the merits. While the lawyer is not personally required to actually have probable cause to 
initiate or continue proceedings (according the to Restatement comments), id. 5 674 cmt a lawyer who acts without 
probable cause must do so "primarily for the purpose of aiding h s  client in obtaining aproper adjudication of his 
claim," id. (emphasis added). However, lack of proper purpose for adjudication exists, for instance: "when the person 
bringing the civil proceedings is aware that h s  claim is not meritorious." Id. 5 676 cmt. c. The same comment adds 
that a person "cannot believe that the claim is meritorious . . . if he realizes that the adludication will not be in his 
favor unless the court o r j u ~ y  is misled." Id The upshot is, then, this: According to the Restatement of Tods, a lawyer 
may not lawfully proceed in litigation unless the lawyer either (a) reasonably believes that the client's claim is 
founded on actual facts (probable cause), or (b) actually believes that the client could win without the c o u t  or jury 
being misled as to any matter of fact or law (proper adjudication). 
39 Proposed Rule 3.1 -Public DiscussionDraft, Ethics 2000 Commission, April 12, 2000, available at  
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/1ule31 html (new material in italics). 
Fabricating Controversies and the Challenge of "Equal Justice'-It is frequently 
observed that there is a substantial shortfall in legal services to the less well off in our society, and that 
addressing this shortfall is among the impottant responsibilities of our profession. However, it is likely 
that one of the principal contributing causes of this shortfall is our particular vision of the adversq 
system. One particularly problematic aspect of that vision is the idea that, if a case has a reasonable 
chance of being won, then the l a y e r  ought to pursue it with the full force of zealous representation, 
even if l a y e r  has "confidential" howledge that the cause may be substantively unmerited. For 
instance, according to this vision, a l a y e r  for a corporation should zealously defend the corporation 
against a tort claim even if the l a y e r  confidentially hows  that the corporation's employees indeed 
committed the tort in question, acting in the scope of their employment. Even worse, some prosecutors 
think they are entitled to bring the full force of the state down on a defendant 
even when they do not themselves believe the defendant is guilty; they think it is enough to prosecute 
that a jury can probably be persuaded to convict.40 As long as the l a y e r  believes the case canbe won 
or plausibly defended on the "facts" and law, the current ethic seems to allow (and perhaps, even, 
require) that the l a y e r  press for victoty as zealously as possible-whatever may be the layer 's  actual 
private assessment of the basis for the action. Rather than seeing service to justice as being any part of 
any layer's individual ethical responsibility, it is viewed instead as solely and exclusively the 
responsibility of the system as a whole. 
However, this aspect of our particular adversq ethic has especially unfortunate effects when a 
layer's zealous representation skills are unleashed full force against a person who is either poorly 
represented or not represented at all. It is especially the persons who are in under-represented classes 
in our society who are likely to be unable to adequately test and rebut the evidence that is mounted 
against them. It is especially the under-represented who will likely be unable to make the case for 
prevailing even when, on the law and facts, they should. The problem of "unequal justice" has no simple 
solution, but it would at least be mitigated if, unlike today, all layers  had a clear ethical responsibility to 
refrain from fabricated controversy in situations where they how,  or reasonably should how,  that their 
clients should not prevail. By clearly prohibiting the fabrication of controversy, the Model Rules would 
better assure that the negative effects of the present shortfall of legal services is not exacerbated by the 
adversq excesses of the legal profession itself 
Summing up the Problem of Fabricated ControversyTo make clear that it is wrong to 
concoct controversy in the hope of provoking an ultimate legal miscarriage, there must be additional 
language, beyond the changes proposed by the Ethics Zl00 Commission. The Model Rules need an 
amendment, such as the one suggested above, to make it clear that the adversarial tactic of fabricating 
controversies, or pretending disagreement on any point of contention, is a distinctly unethical way to 
secure a legal advantage or to avoid a legal disadvantage. Given the traditionally limited understanding of 
the frivolousness and dilatoriness concepts, the Model Rules need a specific reference to pretended or 
fabricated controversy, as set forth in the suggested language above. 
40 See Stanley V .  Fisher, In Search ofthe VvtumProsecutor: A ConceptuaZFramework, 15 Am. J. Cnm. L. 197,230 n 144 
(1 988) (stating that while [c]ommentators dffer about whether it is ethical to proceed absent personal belief in the 
defendant's guilt. . . [tlhe prevailing view, at least in the world of practice, surely permits prosecutors to do so. See 
also Bennett Gershman, TkeProsecutor'sLktj to Truth (forthcoming) (confirming this view among "many prosecutors 
with whom I have been acquainted over the years," and arguing that prosecutors have a duty to pre-judge the truth 
of the witnesses and cases they present). 
111. ABUSE OF CONFIDENTALlTY 
The of$ce of attorney does not permit, much less does it demand. . . any manner of 
fraud or chicane.4' 
Layer-client confidentiality provides important public benefits, but there are also significant 
detriments that can flow from its misuse.42 When layers routinely withhold "damaging" information, 
their calculated nomdisclosures and partial disclosures can foreseeably lead to false understandings in 
the minds of others. Obviously, it is not the purpose of ihe l a y e r  duty of coniidentiality to foster false 
understandings; it is merely an unintended by-product. To make partial disclosures of fact with a 
purpose to deceive or when material deception is foreseeable, whether it be done in bargaining or in 
litigation, is an abuse of confidentiality. 
In order to preserve the benefits of coniidentiality while preventing the detriments and abuses 
that can occur, a new paragraph (c) should be added to Rule 1.6, as follows: 
(c) It is an abuse of confidentiality for a layer ,  in any proceeding or matter, to pursue a 
strategy or design of selectively revealing information when the l a y e r  has or claims a 
duty to conceal other information without which the revealed information would be 
misleading or deceptive on any issw of material fact. 
The purposes of this proposed new paragraph would be to clarlfy that Rule 1.6 is not intended 
to foster deception; it would expressly prohibit layers  from misusing coniidentiality as part of 
stratagems of partial-truth advocacy. "Partial-truth advocacy" means any form of advocacy that is 
intended to distract from or obfuscate the material facts of a matter, or to cause others to form 
erroneous conclusions about such facts, by affiatively stressing part of the trutb while asserting a duty 
to hide other parts of the truth. The proposed new paragraph would declare that layers  have a 
professional obligation to refmin from knowingly pressing or advancing half-truths in the representation 
of clients. 
Detriments that Can Flow From Abuses of Confidentiality-Contidentiality is, for many 
practical reasons, a crucial feature of the layer-client relationship. The rule of coniidentiality is not, 
however, an unalloyed benefit to clients, the profession or the system of justice. There is a dehite 
downside evety time a l a y e r  claims an ethical duty to conceal some key part of the truth. The major 
downside is, of course, that the rule of confidentiality causes otherwise "available" and material 
information to be withheld from persons who need it to make informed judgments in private matters and 
to cany out justice in accordance with the law.43 Despite the vety important objectives that justify 
confidentiality, its use must therefore be kept in careful balance with the needs of justice, which depends 
on truth. When truth will bring a client unpleasant consequences, there is obviously a temptation to 
disguise or conceal. But the law can only apply to the facts that are before it. Ifthe facts are distorted by 
41 ABA CANONS 15. "Chicane" meam the same as chicaneIy, ie., the use of clever but tricky talk or action to deceive, 
evade, etc. as in legal dealings. Webster's New World DictionaIy 243 (3d college ed. 1997). 
42 For f h e r  discussion on the general topic, see the excellent economic analysis of Daniel R. Fischel, Lawyersand 
ConfidenL%zl@, 65 U. &. L. Rev. 1 (1998). 
43 Concerning the analogous attorney-client privilege, Wigmore wrote: "Its benefits are all indrect and speculative; 
its obstruction is plain and concrete." 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 557 ( 3 ~ .  ED. 1940). 
partial truths, so will be the application of the law, and justice will founder 
These negative effects are not, moreover, confiied to miscarriages of justice in individual cases. 
The misuse by layers  of the rule of confidentiality is no doubt partly responsible for the deep-seated 
wariness and apprehension that the public feels toward layers, for the idea that layers  deal regularly 
in half-truths all too often having something up their sleeves. As surveys cited earlier there is a 
widespread public impression that layers  cannot be fundamentally trusted. This distrust is unfohnate 
not merely for the profession but for the whole justice system. The misuse of confidentiality may 
sometimes work to the advantage of certain clients, but the advantage is purchased at a high cost. When 
layers misuse confidentiality and deal in partial truths they reduce their credibility overall, a detriment to 
all of the la\?yers1 clients. When justice is in the hands of professionals whose full and unstinting fidelity 
to truth is a matter not merely of doubt but also of abundant grim humor, the effect can hardly strengthen 
public trust in the rule of law. 
The Model Rules should clearly reflect that the proper purpose of confidentiality is not to 
obstruct the truth; that is only a regrettable by-product. The proper role of the rule of confidentiality is to 
shield the client, so the client can be open with his or her l a y e r  without fear that the l aye r  might later 
step forward to bear witness for the adversa~y.~~ When, however, a l a y e r  deliberately adopts and 
pursues a strategy of partial truth advocacy, of presenting certain evidence while selectively withholding 
other material evidence, the rule of confidentiality acts not merely as a shield but becomes, instead, a 
tool of attack. It becomes a device or scheme to distort, deceive and obstruct. 
Obstruction is precisely what occurs when a l a y e r  zealously urges the existence of certain facts 
while willfully concealing other facts that the l a y e r  reasonably knows are needed to avoid fostering 
false or erroneous inferences. Whether the layer's immediate purpose is merely to distract from the 
truth or to distort it, the ultimate goal is the same: to prevent the substance of applicable laws from 
applying to the facts that actually occurred-to derail the rule of law. 
Ordinary Honesty and "Honesty" Under Model Rule 1 . 6 . 4 s  stated in the introduction, 
most layers  are rather scrupulous about their ethics and careful to avoid lies; yet the public's distrust of 
layers runs deep. If layers seldom lie, why the bad reputation for honesty? The problem is, I th& 
rooted in a variance of ideas of the vety concept of "honesty," a variance that is reflected in the Model 
Rules. Among the public at large, honesty in not generally understood in merely the cramped and 
narrow sense that layers often have in mind ("no outright lies") but in a far more expansive sense. In 
this broader sense, an honest person means someone who takes care never to mislead other people. It 
means a person who does not make it a practice to deliberately hold back crucially pertinent information 
while wing  to persuade others. Foremost, an honest person means one who regards responsibility for 
the full and complete truth to be the personal responsibility of each and evety individual, not as just the 
collective responsibility of some larger "system." 
By contrast, the lawyer's standard of honesty under Rule 1.6 is not nearly as onerous as the 
M See supra notes 3-6. 
41 Note that, strictly speaking, I refer here only to the ethical duty of confidentiality, not to the evidentiaIy rule of 
attorney-client privilege, which shelds clients from having their own lawyers be impressed into service as witnesses for 
the adversaIy. S ~ ~ M O D E L  RULE$ Rule 1.6, cmt. 5. 
general public standard. The layer's standard of honesty is instead fitted to a particular conception 
(albeit not a necessary conception) of the adversq system. In this version of the adversq system, the 
advocates owe virtually their entire loyalty not to truth but to clients. The assumption behind Rule 1.6 
seems to be that the full and open truth is not the personal responsibility of any individual l a y e r  in 
particular, but only of the justice system as a whole, a system in which the players may do whatever they 
can, short of crime or outright lies, to encourage whichever misconceptions happen to serve their cause. 
If any of the resulting misconceptions need to be corrected, it is up to the adversq to see that the job 
gets done. Although an ethical l a y e r  does not lie or help the client to lie, the l a y e r  has a far more 
subtle art. By carefully choosing what to disclose and conceal, the lawyer weaves stories that are false 
out of statements that are true. 
By purposely withholding information or willfully undermining accurate but "damaging" evidence, 
layers  can frequently cause jurors and others to form misleading impressions of their clients and past 
events. Most layers  would probably assert, moreover, that it is not merely the right but the duty of 
layers  to bend portrayals of the truth to their client's advantage, even if that means inducing others to 
fall into mistaken beliefs. When a business client does not want to reveal the whole stoty in negotiating a 
deal, it is not the layer's job to disturb the false impressions the other side forms as a result. If a guilty 
client wants to say "I didn't cb it," then that client's nomguilt is the picture of reality the lawyer is 
expected to convey. In effect, layers  often encourage others to form conceptions of reality that do not 
even purport to correspond to the actual facts as either the l a y e r  or the client honestly sees them. 
All of this is done, to be sure, with generally high objectives. There are obviously important 
values other than truth, and most layers  surely believe that the false impressions they may convey are 
in pursuit of those values. However, those values do not include a "right" to obtain legal advantages that 
are not merited under the actual facts of a case or to avoid legal disadvantages that the law would 
prescribe if the full truth were revealed. When layers  succeed in conveying false impressions in the 
pursuit of unmerited legal advantages or to protect their clients from legal accountability, people feel that 
justice has been not merely deceived but cheated. And for many outside the profession, that is a 
problem. 
It is not enough to say, in response to these concerns, that "no human system can be perfect." 
By tolerating misuse of the rule of confidentiality in partial-truth advocacy, the present Rule 1.6 allows 
the imperfections to be built right into the process, and the public has no trouble seeing this. Almost 
evetyone suspects that the vety reason many clients seek legal counsel is to avoid the unpleasant 
consequences that the law prescribes for cases such as theirs-stated bluntly, to avoid the intent of the 
law. Some people simply do not want the results that the law provides for the actual facts of their 
situation, and they think that, with a smart layer,  "undesired legal results can be avoided, legally, under 
the system that we have. And they are right. 
The result, however, is a relatively high level of public distrust of layers, and that can readily 
redound to the discredit of the justice system that layers  maintain. The distrust is not, therefore, a 
minor tangential annoyance or merely the problem of an insular profession, but it is something that can 
cut to the heart of the public's basic civic faith in the rule of law. For better or worse, most people 
probably think the core ideal of justice can only be served if the substance of the law applies to the 
events that actually occur. The concept of "right" is seen as based on trutk and not merely a matter of 
who wins regulated competitions to reinvent the past. People expect the law to provide genuinely 
deserved results, not just "due" process. 
As long as layers  in negotiations and advocacy do not even purport to present the full and 
objective truth as they or their clients honestly see it, no amount of professed concern about values 
"other than truth" is going to change the declining esteem in which the public holds our profession and 
the system ofjustice it maintains and serves. 
The Special Problem of the Criminal Defense Context-It may seem hard in the civil 
context to reach a better balance between the goals of confidentiality and the truth needs of justice, but 
it may seem virtually impossible to do so in criminal defense. A criminal defendant has, after all, a 
constitutional right to "effective assistance" of counsel in mounting the defense.46 But how can a criminal 
defense l a y e r  possibly hope to convince a juty that the defendant is not guilty except by selectively 
stressing the "helpfuY evidence while downplaying or hiding the damaging stuff! Partial-truth advocacy 
seems integral to the process and, in many cases, the vety essence of the game. The fallacy here seems 
to be the notion that an accused cannot be considered to have received effective assistance of counsel 
unless the l a y e r  has tried to assert a full-blown exoneration defense, if that is what the accused wants. 
As far as the question of "effectiveness" goes, there does not appear to be any empirical 
evidence that criminal defendants would be worse off, on the whole, if defense layers  swore off 
strategies of selective nomdisclosure and partial-truth advocacy. Indeed, innocent defendants 
(presumably the ones we are most concerned to acquit) would probably be generally better off if 
criminal defendants were represented by l ayers  whose reputations for probity were beyond reproach. 
When Chief Justice Earl Warren was a California county prosecutor, he and the public defender 
developed a relationship of trust that apparently worked to the considerable advantage of the innocent 
accused. Warren told the public defender that any time he was convinced Warren was prosecuting an 
innocent person, he should tell Warren so. Then, according to the defender, Warren "would let me look 
at his files and, if that didn't change my mind, Warren would not prosecute. He trusted me to be as 
honest with him as he was with me." 47 
What layers  sometimes seem to forget is that, if criminal defense layers are none too 
trustworthy in their manner of defense, it does none of their clients a service. A person who makes 
himself generally not believable is one who will not be believed.48 
For guilty defendants, of course, a believable l a y e r  may not always be better. In particular, 
having a lawyer who will not play games with truth may mean it will be hard to put on a successful 
exoneration defense unless you can successfully bamboozle your own layer .  This would present a 
clear drawback for guilty defendants who want to pretend innocence in the hope of getting an unmerited 
reduction of charge, dismissal or decision not to prosecute. Ifthey tell their honest l a y e r  the truth the 
game may be up. By lying they take the substantial risk of depriving their lawyer of the truthful 
46 US. CONST. amend. 6. 
47 LEO KRATCHER, EARL WARREN: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY 57 (1x7). 
48 See Peter C. Kostant, ParadigmRegained:How CmpetitionFrom Accolm~gFimMqvHelp Corporate Attorneys 
Recapture theEthicaZHigh Grow24 20 Pace L. Rev. 43,65 (1 999) (suggesting that when corporate lawyers behave in 
untmstworthy ways for one client they breach their fiduciaq duties to all their clients by undercutting their own 
credibility. 
information the l a y e r  may need to get the best deal. Even ifthis is so, however, it is still not a sound 
reason for lawyers to try to get judges and juries to swallow versions of past events that they should 
h o w  are not true. Layers  should not dishonestly withhold information, pretend controversy or distract 
from truth just so the guilty can have the aid of counsel to assert a false defense. In a world of honest 
men and women, the scoundrel may be at a disadvantage, but that does not mean honest people should 
act like scoundrels in order to compensate. 
When all is said and done, it cannot be denied that it would probably be harmful to some 
criminal defendants if all la\?yers eschewed all partial-truth advocacy. It is, however, equally likely that 
such a change would provide a defmite advantage to other defendants, especially those who are 
innocent or are "not-guilty-as-charged." These latter classes of defendants would almost certainly be 
better off if their layers'  presentations could be more readily belie~ed.~' 
Still, it may be objected, there is the Constitution. It secures both a right to effective counsel and 
a right to make the govemment prove its case. Thus, the argument goes, unless layers  can pretend 
their guilty clients' innocence even when they know the facts, clients will be forced to make an 
unconstitutional choice: They will forced to choose between their constitutional right to effective counsel 
and their constitutional right to put the govemment to its proof 
Putting the matter like this, however, overstates the case. In the first place, "one cannot invoke 
the Sixth Amendment [right to counsel] as a justification for presenting what might have been a half- 
truth.'"' Moreover, there 6 no suggestion that the mles against involuntaty self-incrimination or the 
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt should not continue to apply in all their force. Even if 
the defendant's counsel refused to engage in partial-truth advocacy, the govemment could still be put to 
its proof The only suggestion is that a defendant who wants to controvert the government's case would 
be expected to do so truthf~lly.~' The defendant would not have a "right" to present misleading evidence 
or knowingly disparage accurate proof in the hope that some undeserved advantage might emerge. The 
Supreme Court has never held the Constitution to require more than this. 
True, the accused has the ultimate authority to decide on whether to plead guilg2 and since the 
lawyer must abide the defendant's choice, the lawyer has no right to throw in the towel just because the 
l a y e r  disbelieves the defendant's plea. What, then, should the honest l a y e r  do? If the defendant 
pleads not guilty and f m l y  professes innocence, the layer 's  posture should be one of constant and 
resilient suspicion of all incriminating evidence, including any prior admissions by the defendant himselt: 
If, however, the defendant admits guilt in confidence but says to the l a y e r  "I want to make them prove 
it," then the honest layer's posture of suspicion is modified, to fit the client's own stoty. While the 
l a y e r  should still "mak[e] sure that the prosecution can prove the State's case with evidence that was 
lawfully obtained and may lawfully be considered by the trier of fact,"53 it would be dishonest to go so 
49 See Humbach, supra note 1, at 112-24 for further related discussion of problem of criminal defense counsel and 
confidentiality. 
10 United States v. Nobles, 422 U S .  225,241 (1 975). 
5 ,  CjNix v. Whteside, 475 U S .  157 (1 986) (stating that the trial is a "search for truth). 
52 See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U S .  745,751 ( 1 9 8 3 ) ; M o ~ ~ ~  RULE$ Rule 12(a). 
13 McCoy v. Court of Appeals, 486 U S .  429,434 (1988). C j  MODEL RULE$ Rule 3.1, stating that: "A lawyer for a 
defendant in a criminal proceeding . . . may neveheless so defend the proceeding as to require that every element of 
the case be established." 
far as to controvert the truthfulness or credibility of witnesses whose testimony agrees with the client's 
own version of the facts.54 In other words, once the state does succeed in sufficiently proving its case 
with lawfully obtained admissible evidence whose tenor the defendant does not in fact dispute, then the 
defendant has received all that he or she is entitled to. If the l a y e r  were to tty to undercut that 
evidence, even though it is consistent with the defendant's own (confidential) stoty and the l a y e r  has 
no reason to doubt it, then the l a y e r  would be departing from the "search for truth'' and embarking 
upon a game. It would be, in short, to fabricate controversy. 
Similarly, it would k dishonest for a l a y e r  to present evidence favorable to the client if that 
favorable evidence would be foreseeably and materially misleading in the absence of other facts that the 
l a y e r  is duty-bound to keep confidential. Such an abuse of confidentiality goes beyond the layer 's  
duty of "defending the proceeding [so] as to require that evety element of the case be e~tablished,"~~ 
and enters into the realm of creating alternative realities that are calculated to distract the fmder of fact. 
In short, if the defense l a y e r  has no truthful alternative stoty to sell, then the l a y e r  cannot honestly 
pretend there is one and, therefore, he or she is effectively consigned to merely testing the government's 
56 
case. 
While the foregoing discussion focuses on criminal defense, it is not meant to imply that 
prosecutors should not also be subject to comparable, if not even stricter, prohibitions against coyness 
with the truth. The only reason for stressing the defense context is that certain unique features of that 
context (defendant's right to plead not guilty, the constitutional right to counsel and the presumption of 
innocence) make a more extended discussion necessary. 
Confidentiality in Federal Criminal Prosecutions-For better or worse, recent 
developments in kderal law suggest that the defense layer's duties of candor and full disclosure may, 
at least in federal prosecutions, already be much broader than typically thought today. Consider, for 
example, the layer 's  obligations under 18 U.S.C. 5 1001, as amended by the False Statements 
Accountability Act of 1996: 
5 1001. Statements o r  entries generally 
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction 
of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United States, 
14 Unless, of course, the lawyer has some independent ground for thinking that the witnesses are in fact lying or 
erring. 
55 See MODEL RULES Rule 3.1 
16 I have heard the objection that, as a practical matter, a defense cannot be very effective if the jurors are not 
presented with a credible case for innocence but are told, instead, that the only question for them to decide is 
whether the government has presented sufficient proof. The thought here seems to be that jurors want to decide the 
defendant's fate based on their beliefs about who did the crime infact, not on the basis of a technical legal test. In 
other words, if jurors h l y  believe the defendant did if they are not likely to be impressed by defense arguments that, 
guilty or not, the defendant should be let go if government's proof is technically insufficient. 
However, the very notion that a guilty defendant cannot be convicted except on "proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt" carries with it the corollaq that a real task of fact-finders is to make determinations about the 
sufficiency of the government's proof--whether it shows guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. To say thatjurors cannot 
be trusted with knowledge of the h e  nature of their task is to make a serious indictment of the j u ~ y  system as we 
know it-claiming in effect that the system must rest on a fundamental deception or else it will not work correctly. It 
is a claim that I, for one, do not accept. If is the case that defense lawyers in our system cannot "effectively" assist 
their clients except by presenting half-truths and invented scenarios, then the system is more morally retrograde than 
I am prepared to concede. 
knowingly and willfully- 
(1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick scheme, or device a material fact; 
(2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation; or 
(3) makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any materially 
false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entty; 
shall be fmed under this title or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both. 
(b) Subsection (a) does not apply to a party to a judicial proceeding, or that party's counsel, 
for statements, representations, writings or documents submitted by such party or counsel to a 
judge or magistrate in that proceeding. 57 
Notably, 5 1001 can apply to any out of court statement in any federal proceeding. 
Consequently, if a federal prosecutor wants to fmd out what a defense attorney knows about the facts 
of a client's case, all that the prosecutor needs to do, it seems, is to ask with appropriately probing 
questions. The defense attorney could of course claim privilege and refuse to respond but, ifthe attorney 
has a truthful answer that would work favorably for the client, then a refusal to answer promptly could 
easily harm the client's interest-say, in subsequent plea bargaining. The delayed answer might seem too 
much like a concocted stoty when offered up at a later date. Anyway, defense attorneys are ordinarily 
eager to share exculpatoty facts with the prosecution and, indeed, if the defense attorney has a response 
that would help the client, there would likely be a duty to answer.58 That being so, the attorney's claim of 
privilege would be eloquent in itself, an implicit revelation of the unfavorable or "damaging" information 
whose existence the prosecutor seeks to confirm. By carefully framing the questions put to defense 
attorneys, a prosecutor could easily gain at least enough such revelations to shatter a potential plea- 
bargain or, if the attorney's "admissions" got to the jurors, to prevent an acquittal. 
Unfortunately, the boxed-in defense attorney has little room to maneuver under 5 1001. Ifthe 
attorney attempts to maintain confidentiality by deflection or other verbal ploys implying lack of 
knowledge ("I don't know") or by "exculpatoty no''-type responses, he or she runs the risk of 
committing a federal felony under 5 1001.59 The statutoty language of 5 1001 is vety broadly worded in 
prohibiting such verbal ploys ("conceals, or covers up by any trick scheme, or devicen6'). For its part, 
the Supreme Court has cast doubt on the possibility that there are any implicit exceptions in 5 100 1, 
expressly rejecting the argument (in relation to 5 1001) that "the Court may interpret a criminal statute 
more narrowly than it is ~r i t ten . '~ '  
In short, unless the Supreme Court "fmds" an unwritten exception in 5 1001 in some future case, 
the federal defense attorney's ethical duty of confidentiality may already be, in effect, subject to and 
limited by a duty not to "conceal" or "cover up," imposed by federal law. There is, of course, the 
constitutional right to counsel, but that right does not include the right to do any thing that would 
17 18 U.S.C. 5 1001 (emphasis added). 
18 See MODEL RULE$ Rule 1.1 (Competence) and Rule 1.3 Diligence). 
19 SeeBroganv. United States, 118 S. Ct. 805 (1998)(holding that any out-of-court falsehood, even if only in an effod 
to brush off an accusing question with a denial, is a violation of 5 1001). 
60 Emphasis added. 
61 Id. at 810. Lest one think it far-fetched that federal prosecutors might stad going after defense attorneys, see Teny 
CaJter, BurtingtheLawyers:Fedssh$dmg warfrom &@ins to crimmal defense bar, A.B.A. J., Feb. 2000, at 18. 
constitute "violating the law,I6' and 5 1001 is manifestly a law. The only way it might not be "law" is if 
Congress does not have the constitutional power to make such a modification of the extant contours of 
layer-client confidentiality, as we have come to know them. If not, then 5 1001, as applied to layers, 
is unconstitutional. While there is some authority that there may be a degree of sixth amendment right- 
to-counsel protection for the attorney-~lientprivilege,~~ there is no reason at this point to think today's 
Supreme Court will hold that the current balance between the rule of confidentiality and the trutb needs 
of justice is written in constitutional stone." 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The justice system seeks to influence human behavior by providing various legal advantages and 
imposing various liabilities whose application depends for the most part on the things that people do. 
Many times people will see it as personally desirable to seek a legal advantage that is not merited under 
the law or to avoid a liability that is called for by the law, given the facts of their own particular situation. 
One effective way to do tbis is to fabricate controversy in order to make a play on the system and take 
advantage of the potential for error, for chance or for other miscarriage that is inherent in legal process. 
Another is to keep the actual facts of past events obscure. With a l a y e r  who manipulates the facts, a 
client can escape the intent of the law. 
Abuse of confidentiality and fabrication of controversy are both tactics that can play a major 
role in layers' effoa to lead the law to misapply. The fact that many lamyers tbink it is permissible to 
do these things in order to help their clients escape the law's intent merely shows that there is a 
widespread ambivalence toward the actual rule of law. However, the profession's responsibility to 
justice does not permit layers  to seize evety available legal victoty, irrespective of actual factual merit. 
It does not permit the misuse of confidentiality as a sword that enables advocates to mislead by means 
of calculated partial disclosures. It does not permit l aye rs  to fabricate controversy as a strategy to skirt 
the rule of law. These two techniques may sometimes serve the interests of individual clients, especially 
those who would be discomfited by full and impartial enforcement, but they bring the profession into 
disrepute and, therefore, disserve the interests of clients and the nation overall. 
In order to strengthen the public's confidence in the justice system we must make it easier than it 
is now for the public to trust the layers  who are its custodians. Layers  should never fabricate 
controversy as a tactic to derail justice and should never abuse the duty of confidentiality by selectively 
portraying reality in betrayal of that trust. 
62 Nix v. mtes ide ,  475 US.  157,166 (1 986). One must be careful not to overreadNix. It cannot be quite correct to 
state, as the C o u t  did i n N g  that the lawyer's "overarching duty to advocate the defendant's cause" is "[pllainly . . . 
limited to legitimate, lawful conduct." Id. at166. Indeed, this statement seems to get things exactly backwards, 
implying that the constitutional rights of the people are limitable by a legislature's laws. In actuality, of course, it is 
the other way around with the legislature's power to make laws being delimited by the Constitution. Accordingly, 
the threshold question in constitutional cases like N&is whether the constitutional right to effective assistance of 
counsel even allows the "law" in question that purportedly limits the lawyer's representation effods. Even in the case 
of a law that is as obviously constitutional as the law against suborning perjury (dispositive inNix), it begs the 
question to simply assume that the law in question is constitutional. 
63 Nekuv. United States, 620 A2d  259,262 @ C  1993) (applied a balancing test). 
64 See, e.g., Fisher v. United States, 425 U S .  391, 403 (1976) (stating that the attorney-client privilege applies only 
where "necessary to acheve its purpose"); United States v. Nobles, 422 U S .  225 (1 975). See also Jones v. Barnes, 463 
U S .  at 753 n. 6 ("[Tlhe fact that the ABA may have chosen to recognize a given practice as desirable or appropriate 
does not mean that that practice is required by the Constitution"). 
